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Electricity liberalisation in Britain: the quest
for a satisfactory wholesale market design
David Newbery
*
Britain was the exemplar of electricity market reform,  demonstrating the  importance  of  ownership
unbundling  and  workable  competition  in  generation  and  supply.  Privatisation  created  de  facto
duopolies  that  supported  increasing  price-cost  margins  and  induced  excessive  (English)  entry.
Concentration  was  ended  by  trading  horizontal  for  vertical  integration  in  subsequent  mergers.
Competition arrived just as the Pool was replaced by New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA)
intended to address its claimed shortcomings. NETA cost over £700 million, and had ambiguous market
impacts. Prices fell dramatically as a result of (pre-NETA) competition, generating companies withdrew
plant, causing fears about security of supply and a subsequent widening of price-cost margins.
JEL: L94, D43
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INTRODUCTION
The standard model of the electricity supply industry (ESI) in almost every country before
liberalisation was an effectively vertically integrated franchise monopoly under either public
ownership or cost-of-service regulation. Investment in generation and transmission were (in
theory) chosen to deliver the least-cost expansion plan (subject to government energy policy on
fuel  mix  and  plant  choice),  financed  by  low-cost  borrowing  underwritten  by  the  franchise
revenue  base.  Britain  was  no  exception,  with  the  entire  ESI  under  state  ownership  since
nationalisation in 1947. The Central Electricity Generation Board (CEGB) owned all generation
and transmission in the whole of England and Wales, selling bulk power to twelve Area Boards,
responsible for distribution and supply (retailing). In Scotland, the North of Scotland Hydro-
Electric Board (NSHEB) and the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) each held regional
franchises that included generation, transmission, distribution and supply. The Government set
the annual External Financial Limit restricting (publicly provided) borrowing, which in some
years could be negative, implying a net dividend payment to the Treasury. The tariff structure
was moderately sophisticated, with a two-part zonal Bulk Supply Tariff charging for capacity
(of both generation and transmission), and variable costs (energy and regionally differentiated
losses).  Area  Boards offered  a  variety  of  tariffs,  with  various  forms  of  peak-hour  capacity
charges. While the pricing may have been sophisticated, investment planning, and particularly
investment delivery, was poor, slow and costly, and there were few incentives to deliver cost
efficiency.
Liberalising and restructuring the ESI was intended to replace this command and control
structure  with  its  regulated  charges  by  a  decentralised  market-driven  system  that  would
nevertheless deliver secure, reliable electricity efficiently and at competitive prices. At the time
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the Government decided to restructure and privatise the ESI, there were few models available.
The United States had evolved the contractual form of investor-owned franchise monopolies
under  state  cost-of-service  regulation  that  was  criticised  for  poor  incentives,  stranded
investments, and in some states, high prices. Chile, on the other side of the planet, had been
reforming, restructuring and gradually privatising its ESI since 1978, while Norway already
operated a spot market for club members for wholesale energy, but remained publicly owned.
With  no  obvious  model  to  follow,  considerable  political  pressure  to  deliver  a  competitive
outcome  (in  contrast  to  the  earlier  privatisations  of  telecoms,  gas  and  water),  and  a  tight
timetable,  the  challenge  was  to  design  a  set  of  markets  and  institutions  to  deliver  these
objectives.  Of  comparable  importance,  the  design  had  to  allow  a  smooth  and  predictable
transition to a market-based system not just for electricity, but for the nationalised coal industry,
three-quarters  of  whose  (largely  uneconomic)  output  was  sold  to  the  ESI,  which  in  turn
depended on coal for three-quarters of its output. The generation and distribution companies
were to be sold to the general public and therefore needed predictable revenues on which they
could be valued.
2 RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATISATION
Two different solutions were adopted for Britain (and yet another for Northern Ireland). The
Electricity Act 1989 created the post of the Director General of Electricity Supply, the DGES, to
regulate the natural monopoly wires businesses of the National Grid Company (NGC) and the
Regional Electricity Companies, and to set price caps, which would be reset at periodic reviews
every 4-5 years.  He had a duty to ensure that reasonable demands for electricity were met, that
licence holders were able to finance their activities, to promote competition in generation and
supply,  to  protect  customer interests,  and to  promote  efficiency.    The  Office  of  Electricity
Regulation, Offer, was set up by the Government as an independent body under the Electricity
Act, headed by the DGES.
In England and Wales, the Electricity Act divided the CEGB, with its 74 power stations
and the national grid, into four companies.  Sixty per cent of conventional generating capacity
(40 power stations with 30 GW capacity) were placed in National Power, and the remainder (23
stations of 20 GW) were placed in PowerGen. The original plan was to place the 12 nuclear
stations with 8 GW in National Power, which had been given the bulk of the fossil generation in
the hope that its resulting size would be financially viable.  At a late stage the financial advisors
made it clear the nuclear stations were not saleable at a reasonable price.  They were transferred
to Nuclear Electric and kept in public ownership until 1996. The high-tension grid, together with
2 GW of pumped-storage generation,
1 were transferred to the National Grid Company (NGC).
These four companies were vested (i.e. created) as public limited companies (plcs) on March
31st 1990, at the same time as the twelve distribution companies, now known as the Regional
Electricity Companies (RECs).  NGC was transferred to the joint ownership of the RECs, and
the RECs were sold to the public in December 1990. The pumped-storage generation of NGC
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was separated and sold to Mission Energy at the end of 1995, and the RECs sold their shares in
NGC in a flotation on the Stock Market, also at the end of 1995. Sixty per cent of National
Power and PowerGen were subsequently sold to the public in March 1991, with the balance sold
in March 1995.  Competition in generation was introduced by requiring all generators (public
and private) to sell their electricity in a wholesale market, the Electricity Pool.
The Electricity Act also set out a time-table for introducing competition into supply.  At
privatisation, the 5,000 consumers with more than 1 MW demand were free to contract with any
supplier (who could buy directly from the Electricity Pool), but all other consumers had to buy
from their local REC, which had a franchise monopoly.  In 1994 the franchise limit was lowered
to 100 kW, and another 45,000 customers were free to choose their supplier.  Starting in late
1998, the remaining 22 million customers had that right, and by mid-1999 the REC franchises
finally ended.
The Scottish system, with about 10 GW capacity, was also restructured on March 31,
1990, when the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board became Scottish Hydro-Electric, and
the non-nuclear assets of the South of Scotland Electricity Board were transferred to Scottish
Power.  Both were privatised as vertically integrated regulated utilities in June 1991, free to sell
into the English market, using the English Pool price as the reference price for Scottish trading
and operating under the same system of regulation.
The  publicly  owned  nuclear  stations  were  restructured  again  when  the  5  newer
Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) with about 5 GW, together with the new Pressurised
Water Reactor at Sizewell, were transferred from Nuclear Electric together with the 2 AGRs
from Scottish Electric to British Energy.  British Energy was then privatised in 1996.  Nuclear
Electric's 7 remaining old Magnox reactors with about 3 GW (which had negative net value)
were  transferred  to  the  publicly  owned  British  Nuclear  Fuels  Ltd,  the  fuel  (re)processing
company.
2.1  Market and institutional design
The most interesting institutional change in restructuring the British ESI was the creation of the
Electricity Pool - a compulsory bulk electricity spot market that determined the merit order and
wholesale price of electricity in Britain.  This operated as a compulsory day-ahead last price
auction with non-firm bidding, capacity payments for plant declared available (determined as an
exponential  function  of  the  reserve  margin),  and  firm  access  rights  to  transmission  (with
generators compensated if transmission constraints prevented their bids being accepted).  Each
day generators bid their plant into the pool before 10 a.m. and received their dispatch orders and
a set of half-hourly prices by 5 p.m. for the following day. Bids had to be valid for the 48 half-
hourly periods, although generators could specify various technical parameters (minimum load,
ramp rates, etc) in some detail to force a particular pattern of use over the day, and also influence
whether the plant would set the price.
The half-hourly System Marginal Price (SMP) was the cost of generation from the most
expensive  generation  set  accepted  (including  start-up  costs  where  appropriate),  based  on  a
forecast  of  demand  and  ignoring  transmission  constraints.    Generators  declared  available
received capacity payments and, if dispatched, the SMP, which together made up the Pool
Purchase Price, PPP.  All companies buying electricity from the pool paid the Pool Selling Price,
PSP, whose difference from the PPP was the uplift, which covered a variety of other paymentsConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 4
made  to  generators.  The  System  Operator  (National  Grid)  used  the  same  (rather  ancient)
software GOAL to dispatch plant as the former CEGB. As the successor companies had copies
of GOAL, they could shape the rather complex individual plant bids (start-up, no-load, and three
incremental  prices  plus various technical  parameters)  to  optimise their  revenue,  rather  than
bidding the true parameters.
The various institutions required to manage the decentralised system were codified in the
Pooling and Settlement Agreement, a multilateral contractual arrangement signed by generators
and suppliers which provided the wholesale market mechanism for trading electricity.  It defined
the rules, and required almost all parties wishing to trade electricity in England and Wales to do
so using the Pool's mechanisms.  It provided the supporting financial settlement processes to
compute bills and ensure payment, but did not act as a market maker.
National Grid Company (NGC) owns and controls high voltage transmission, and as the
Transmission System Operator, was responsible for scheduling and despatch.  Elsewhere the
Systems Operator is often legally required to be independent of generation and transmission.
NGC also acted as the Ancillary Services Provider, the Settlement System Administrator and the
Pool Funds Administrator, though again the provision of these services can be and often are
separated from the provision of transmission services.
In addition to the Pool, which acted both as a commodity spot market producing the
reference price and a balancing market, most generators and suppliers signed bilateral financial
contracts for varying periods to hedge the risk of pool price volatility.  The standard contract was
a Contract for Differences (CfD) which specified a strike price (£/MWh) and volume (MWh),
and was settled with reference to the pool price, so that generators were not required to produce
electricity in order to meet their contractual obligations. These CfDs could be one or two-sided,
offering different hedging possibilities. Partly because the market structure was so concentrated,
and partly because of the pass-through nature of the franchise contracts, other markets were slow
to develop and remained very illiquid. The Electricity Forward Agreements market emerged as a
screen-traded over-the-counter market that allowed contracts to be traded anonymously and
portfolio positions balanced.  It failed to evolve into a futures market, partly because of the
illiquidity caused by the large number of products (four-hourly periods for working and non-
working days, for SMP, PPP and uplift), but mainly because the underlying market was so
uncompetitive.
Contracts are not only important for risk-sharing but were also critical in managing the
transition from a vertically integrated company able to pass all its costs through to its captive
customers to a market-based industry in which customers were free to buy from the cheapest
supplier.  The two major transitional problems facing the designers were that British deep-mined
coal  was  considerably  more  expensive  than  imported  coal  (and  was  soon  to  be  revealed
uncompetitive against gas), and that nuclear generation had failed to set aside definable funds for
decommissioning. The surplus available to build up a decommissioning fund after paying for
operating and fuel cycle costs were likely to be far too low given the likely equilibrium Pool
price.  The second problem was dealt with by imposing a Non-fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) on
the RECs (to buy electricity generated from non-fossil fuels, overwhelmingly nuclear power),
and imposing a Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL) on all fossil generation (initially at the rate of 10.8% of
the final sales price).  This levy was paid to Nuclear Electric to build up a fund to meet itsConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 5
liabilities (of about £9.1 billion, which can be compared with the privatisation proceeds from
selling off the CEGB of just under £10 billion).
The first problem of transition was handled by a series of take-or-pay contracts between
the generators and the still state-owned British Coal for the first three years at above world
market prices.  The generators in turn held contracts to supply the RECs for almost all their
output, for up to three years, that allowed the costs of the coal contracts to be recovered from
these contract sales.
2  There was the additional and very important benefit that the profit and loss
accounts of the generators and RECs could be confidently projected for the first three years, and
these provided the necessary financial assurance for the privatisation to proceed.
There  are  two  routes  to  effective  competition  in  generation.    The  first  and  more
satisfactory route is to ensure that capacity is divided between sufficiently many competing
generators that no one generator has much influence over the price.  This option was ruled out
by the tight Parliamentary timetable which gave too little time to reconsider plans and to divide
the generation companies further once it became clear that nuclear power was unsaleable.  At
privatisation, the two fossil generators set the pool price over 90 per cent of the time (the balance
being set by Pumped Storage, which arbitraged a limited amount of electricity from the off-peak
to the peak hours).  Nuclear Electric, Scotland and France supplied base-load power that hardly
ever set the pool price.  Green and Newbery (1992) calculated that a duopoly unconstrained by
entry would have significant market power and would be able to raise pool prices to very high
levels (shown in figure 4 below).
The second and indirect route to competitive pricing is to induce generators to sell a
sufficiently large fraction of their output under contract, and expose them to a credible threat of
entry  if  the  contract  price  (and  average  pool  price)  rises  above  the  competitive  level.    A
generator that has sold power on contract only receives the pool price for the uncontracted
balance.  If this is a small fraction of the total (and it is usually about 10-20 per cent), then there
is little to gain from bidding high in the pool.  High bids run the risk that the plant is not
scheduled, leading to the loss of the difference between the SMP and the avoidable cost, and the
trade-off between lost profit on uncontracted marginal plant and higher inframarginal profits is
increasingly  unattractive  as  contract  cover  increases.    Contracts  and  entry  threats  are
complimentary - entry threats encourage generators to sign contracts, and contracts facilitate
entry.
The advantage of the creating sufficiently many companies for competition is that it does
not need to rely on the continued contestability of entry, and it works well even when the
competitive price is well below the entry price, in periods of excess capacity.  As this route was
not chosen, contracts and entry threats were all that remained, at least if price regulation was to
be avoided.  On vesting, the three generating companies were provided with CfDs for virtually
their entire forecast output, for periods of between one and three years. This both managed the
transition to a free market and initially reduced their incentive to exercise spot market power to
negligible levels, though not their ability to take advantage of transmission constraints and to
game capacity availability.
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2.2  Regulation of domestic suppliers, entry and the “dash for gas”
Initially a minority of the market was free to buy power in the Pool or by contract, and the
captive customers required regulatory assurance that their prices would be reasonable. This
was assured by allowing the RECs to pass through the regulated charges for transmission and
distribution, and requiring them to demonstrate that they had purchased any power on behalf
of  their  captive  customers  “economically”.  In  advising  on  market  design  and  regulation,
Professor Stephen Littlechild (who was subsequently appointed the first DGES) recognised
that the main problem facing the ideal of a competitive ESI was the overwhelming market
power  of  the  incumbents.  If  restructuring  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  deliver  lower
concentration, then entry was the only route to eventual competition. Entry of new merchant
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) would be helped by the existence of long-term contracts
for  gas  and  electricity.  The  solution  was  to  allow  the  RECs  to  offer  long-term  Power
Purchase  Agreements  (PPAs)  to  IPPs,  and  to  hold  equity  as  an  incentive  to  sign  these
contracts. The PPAs allowed the IPPs to sign long-term contracts for gas (usually take-or-
pay) and to issue comparable duration bonds. The economic purchasing requirement was
designed to reduce the risk of “sweet-heart deals”, and, critically, the franchise would end in
1998, limiting the possible damage to captive customers.
The  solution  was  accepted,  and  substantial  entry  occurred.  Within  a  few  months
contracts (generally of 15 years duration) had been signed for some 5 GW of gas-fired CCGT
plant, which, in addition to the incumbents' planned 5 GW of similar plant, would displace
about 25 million tonnes of coal, or nearly half the 1992 generation coal burn of 60 million
tonnes.  The new CCGT capacity amounted to about one-sixth of existing capacity, which
was in any case more than adequate to meet peak demand. The “dash for gas” and the switch
from coal more than halved the size of the remaining deep coal mining industry.  The coal
labour force had fallen from nearly 200,000 at the time of the 1984-5 coal miners' strike to
about 70,000 by 1990, but pit closures reduced numbers to 20,000 by 1993 and less than
10,000 by 1998. Figure 1 shows the rapid entry of gas-fired generation, and the resulting
evolution  of  capacity  connected  to  the  National  Grid.  The  decline  in  CCGT  owned  by
PowerGen and National Power reflects industrial restructuring discussed below.
Capacity payments were made to each generating set declared available for despatch,
and were equal to the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) multiplied by the excess of the Value of
Lost Load (VOLL, initially set at £2,500/MWh and indexed to the retail price index) over the
station's bid price (if not despatched) or the SMP (if despatched). This was set the day ahead
and proved manipulable by declaring plant unavailable, and then re-declaring available on the
day to collect the now raised payment. This practice was investigated by the regulator and new
audit procedures were agreed to reduce the incentives for mis-reporting unavailability (Offer,
1992), together with new Pool rules for computing LOLP. This was now determined by the
highest declared or re-declared capacity in the current and seven previous days, so that there
was  an  eight-day  lag  between  declaring  a  plant  unavailable  and  its  impact  on  LOLP.    A
somewhat perverse implication was that the actual LOLP could be unity (certain power cuts)
while the value used to reward capacity could be almost zero. Newbery (1998c) argued that the
computation of LOLP seemed excessive, given the high level of reliability over the first
decade, and its overestimate may have contributed in part to the high capacity payments. On
the other hand, the VOLL seemed rather low, as Patrick and Wolak (1997) found that largeConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 7
consumers in one area were charged £7,153/MWh in each of the three peak (or “triad”) half-
hours in 1994/5 for grid connection charges.
3 As it was the product of VOLL and LOLP that
determines capacity payments, these two possible errors may have been offsetting.








































Source: NGC Seven Year Statements, various years, and data from J Bowers
In  the  1994-95  financial  year,  the  generators  earned  £1,421  million  from  capacity
payments, or £24.5/kW/year compared to £5,821 million from selling at the SMP.  Capacity
payments were thus 20% of total payments for generation (excluding other ancillary services
supplied by generators to the pool), and far higher than in earlier years when plant was more
fully contracted.  These capacity payments would have been sufficient to build 3GW of new
plant, or nearly 6% of total capacity. In the period 1995-97, the  annual  average  capacity
payment was over £30/kW/yr. During this period, the annual grid connection charge varied
from 8/kW to -£10/kW. The cost of keeping a new open cycle gas turbine to provide reserve
power might be £20/kW in interest and depreciation, and perhaps £6/kW for O&M (MMC,
1996), so capacity payments should have been more than enough for security of supply.
High capacity payments could also provide incentives for large generators to withhold
plant, as Newbery (1995) demonstrated. Depending on the contract cover and plant margin,
generators with a market share of about 30% might have an incentive to withdraw plant,
exactly the opposite incentive to that intended. Green (2004) examined the evidence and
found that this strategy did not appear to have been significant. Later, dissatisfaction with
                                                
3    Admittedly,  these  charges  are  not  known  accurately  until  after  the  peak,  but  large  customers
subscribe to moderately accurate forecasting services that can predict when prices are likely to be very
high. The very low observed price response suggests that consumers value not adjusting  load  in
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capacity payments would be one of the factors causing the DGES to review the workings of
the  Pool  and  recommend  the  changes  that  resulted  in  the  New  Electricity  Trading
Arrangements (NETA) of 2001, after which capacity payments were abolished.
In  addition  to  dispatching  stations,  NGC  as  SO  also  had  to  resolve  transmission
constraints by paying out-of merit generators to run if required (“constrained on”) or not to
run (“constrained off”) in an export-constrained zone even if in the unconstrained dispatch.
Under the vertically integrated CEGB the dispatch schedule automatically determined the
security-constrained efficient dispatch, and the grid appeared adequately sized for such that
organisational  form,  but  in  the  market-driven  unbundled  industry,  the  costs  of  resolving
constraints rapidly increased (to £255 million in 1993-4 or £4.3/kW/yr). NGC offered an
incentive deal to the RECs to share the benefits of reducing these and other costs, an idea that
taken  up  by  Offer.  The  resulting  price  control  for  NGC  contained  incentives  to  reduce
constraint (and other ancillary service) costs, essentially by sharing the costs with a cap and
collar. NGC proved adept at contracting for some plant behind constraints, making minor
reinforcements to the grid, and scheduling maintenance to minimise these costs, reducing
these constraint costs to less than 10% of their peak value.
Another criticism of the Pool was that it was only half a market, lacking any demand
side bidding. That was not quite correct, as NGC operated an annual tender auction for the
provision of standing reserve to assist in its system management function.  Standing reserve was
provided by open-cycle gas turbine and pumped storage plant, but also by demand reductions
and non-centrally despatched small generators, though all had to offer amounts in excess of
3MW.  Large consumers could therefore specify their availability and willingness to reduce
demand in various seasons and at various times of day, and NGC then accepted bids for which
the total cost of providing load reductions were less than VOLL.  In 1997/98 1,809 MW of
centrally  despatched  generation  and  458  MW  of  demand  modification  and  small-scale
generation were contracted (NGC, 1997). The offer curve of such bids suggests that while there
was some moderately cheap demand side flexibility, beyond a quite modest level consumers
needed a higher value than VOLL to be willing to curtail load, again suggesting that VOLL may
have been under-estimated, and that short-run demand elasticities for electricity were very low
(with current control and metering devices).
4 In addition, the Pool developed a less successful
form of demand-side bidding directly into the Pool, and again, its failure was an additional
source of pressure to reform the Pool.
The  Pool Purchasing  Price  determined  the  price  of  raw  (unconstrained)  energy  and
capacity,  but  generators  and  consumers  are  interested  in  the  price  at  their  location.  It  was
appreciated that the theoretical solution to efficient spatial pricing is locational marginal pricing
(LMP)  developed  by  Bohn,  Caramanis  &  Schweppe  (1984).  As  NGC  developed  a  more
satisfactory solution to the rather hastily designed system put in place at privatisation, it was
recognised that LMP faced a number of potentially serious drawbacks, not least of which was
that its performance in the presence of considerable market power was untested (and largely
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loads such as freezers, hot water and storage heaters, and air conditioners where their thermal inertial
allows electricity to be stored for modest periods in the form of heat (or cold). Evidence that this is
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unknown). The additional basis risk of trading at a large number of grid points whose price
could diverge considerably from the Pool price would require a large number of potentially
illiquid  contracts  to  cover  risk.  The  possible  gain  in  allocating  the  costs  of  transmission
constraints and losses more precisely was not thought worth the loss in transparency and
market liquidity. NGC therefore retained zonal access charges based on the incremental costs
of reinforcing the grid to meet demands and supplies in that zone. NGC also publishes annual
Seven Year Statements (looking ahead seven years) which update predictions of demand and
supply  by  zone  and  indicate  where  new  generation  might  best  locate.  The  transmission
charges are paid by consumers based on demand at the three half-hours of system maximum
demand separated by 10 days (the “triad”), and by generators based on declared net capacity
(or output in the triad if facing a negative grid charge).
The more serious weakness in locational pricing was that, in contrast to the CEGB
period, transmission losses were not borne by generators, distorting the merit order, while
firm access rights rewarded, rather than penalising, generators in export constrained zones.
Scotland  was  the  obvious  example,  and  two  successive  attempts  by  Offer  to  introduce
transmission losses were successfully appealed to the courts.
2.3  Performance after privatisation
Privatisation and restructuring the CEGB delivered substantial improvements in efficiency, as
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) document. They estimated that after the first five years, costs
were permanently 6% lower than under the counterfactual continued public ownership, with a
present discounted value at the public sector discount rate of 6% equal to a 100% return on
the sales value of £10 billion. Labour productivity doubled, real fuel costs per unit generated
fell  dramatically  (even  in  the  publicly  owned  nuclear  company),  and  substantial  new
investment occurred at considerably lower unit cost than before privatisation. The contrast
with Scotland was striking, where a similar social cost-benefit study by Pollitt (1999) found
negligible  efficiency  improvements.  One  reason  was  undoubtedly  that  the  two  Scottish
companies were not restructured, and remained vertically integrated, making it more difficult
for competitors to gain access to their home market, even though nominally Scotland was
able to trade in the English electricity Pool. Scotland was an exporter through a severely
constrained interconnector that was not efficiently priced, and had only two local generators,
reducing  the  prospects  of  competition.    Figure  2  shows  the  average  price  of  domestic
electricity in Edinburgh, Scotland, and London, England. Initially, London was 10% more
expensive than Edinburgh, but by 2001 Edinburgh was almost 10% more expensive than
London.
This raises the question, currently exercising the regulator (now named Ofgem, the
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) and the proposed GB System Operator, NGC, on how
access to these scarce interconnectors should be determined and priced (NGC, 2004). If full
nodal pricing is thought problematic, then “market splitting”, in which the SO determines
when constraints isolate markets, and then sets market clearing prices in each zone, as in
Norway, would seem attractive. In particular, it would allow English generators to contract
with  Scottish  consumers,  and  this  counterflow  would  release  more  export  capacity  from
Scotland, as the constraint only applies to net electricity flows. English generators would
effectively  be  paid  to  export  to  Scotland  an  amount  equal  to  the  excess  of  the  EnglishConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 10
marginal price over the Scottish marginal price (which should include transmission losses),
and would thus be able to compete effectively in that market. Under the existing system
Scottish generators could price locally up to the English Pool price, as the shadow price of
the export constraint was not made explicit and they did not pay for the quite substantial
transmission losses.
5
Figure 2 Domestic electricity prices at 2003 prices excluding VAT
Source: DTI Energy Prices, various issues. Figures are averages for credit customers
taking 3,300 kWh/yr
The  lesson  that  vertical  unbundling  (at  least  legal,  and  preferably  ownership)  is
essential for effective competition has been accepted in the new Electricity Directive, and in
the consultation for the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA)
that started in 2003.
6
Privatisation,  combined  with  unbundling  and  a  transparent  wholesale  market,
provided incentives for considerable efficiency improvements, but the concentrated market
                                                
5  Marginal transmission losses from Northern generators to the load centres were often greater than
10%. Despite various attempts and judicial review Ofgem “is of the opinion that it is not legally
possible  for  it  to  approve  this  Modification  Proposal”  (to  introduce  cost-reflective  charging  for
transmission losses). Ofgem Information Note of 30 January 2004.
6  The Energy Bill introduced in November 2003 aims to create a single GB-wide set of arrangements
for trading energy and to access to and use of a single GB transmission system, but is subject to Royal
Assent in July 2004.
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structure  initially  allowed  the  incumbent  generators  to  retain  these  cost  reductions  as
enhanced profits. The social cost-benefit analysis of Newbery and Pollitt (1997) found that
while the overall simple sum of net benefits of privatising the CEGB was nearly £10 billion,
consumers lost relative to the counterfactual in which fuel prices fell and the CEGB had set
prices as in the past, while the owners of the generation companies gained very substantially.
Figure 3 summarises a long and turbulent period of pricing in the England and Wales
wholesale market, during the entire life of the Pool until 2001, and under the New Electricity
Trading  Arrangements  (NETA)  thereafter.  Hourly  and  daily  price  volatility  was  very
considerably higher than the smoothed figures shown. Averaged over the year 1997/8, for
example, the average spread between the highest and lowest half-hourly PPP prices on a day
is 180% of the average price on that day, and the standard deviation of half-hourly prices
over the year is 78% of the average PPP.
7











































Source: Pool data and RPDX data, DTI Energy Prices for fuels, HHI from J Bower
Figure  3  shows  the  fuel  cost  of  generating  electricity  from  coal  at  36%  thermal
efficiency and from gas at 50% gross efficiency (55% net efficiency), and hence the margin
between  the  yearly  moving  average  wholesale  price  and  avoidable  cost.  The  line  with
diamond markers gives on the right hand scale the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of
market concentration of coal-fired plant (for most of this period the price-setting plant). This
                                                
7    Some  of  this  variability  is  predictable  and  can  therefore  be  hedged.  Characterising  the
unpredictability  of  prices,  which  is  a  measure  of  risk,  requires  correcting  for  predictable  time
variations over the day, week and year. The standard deviation of the difference between the actual
half-hourly price and the moving average for that hour was £14/MWh or 55% of the average price.Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 12
is the sum of the squared percentage shares of available capacity, so that the initial value of
just over 5000 represents the equivalent of a duopoly.
8  The evolution of prices is divided into
periods identified by Sweeting (2001). To understand them it is first necessary to discuss the
determinants of imperfectly competitive equilibrium prices in an electricity pool.
3 CHARACTERISING MARKET EQUILIBRIUM IN A POOL
Modelling price formation to understand market power and market efficiency is a challenging
problem that is not yet fully solved. Green and Newbery (1992) modelled the English Electricity
Pool by adapting Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) supply function equilibrium (SFE) model. The
model is difficult to solve and typically gives a continuum of equilibrium prices. Figure  4
reproduces their calibrated model for England and Wales, ignoring contracts and entry threats.
Figure 4 Equilibrium price range ignoring entry threats and contracts
GW
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This approach is attractive and appears to be supported by companies’ claims that they
bid supply schedules. It assumes a single-price gross pool with bids that hold for a reasonable
period of time over which demand varies - as with daily bidding in the English Pool. In its
simplest form it assumes that the supply functions bid are continuous and differentiable, and that
demand is linear with constant slope but varies over the 48 half-hours. Each generator chooses a
                                                
8  The number of equivalent firms is 10,000/HHI.Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 13
supply function that maximises his profits given the residual demand he faces, made up of the
variable total demand less the total supplies bid by other generators. As his bid has to be valid
over the whole daily range of residual demands, instead of choosing a single quantity to submit
to the market that would determine a single price (as under the Cournot assumption), he has to
choose  a  continuous  function  relating  the  quantity  that  he  is  willing  to offer  at  each  price
realisation. The set of feasible solutions will be Nash equilibria in supply functions.
There are, however, difficulties with this approach. Most pools (and the English Pool in
particular) restrict bids to a single price for each quantity offered, producing a step function or
ladder rather than a continuously differentiable function. The Amsterdam Power Exchange is a
good example, where their web site provides the bid and offer ladders for each hour, their
intersection providing the market clearing price for that hour. Fabra et. al (2004) argue that this
radically alters the nature of the equilibrium, and requires modelling the market as a last-price
auction, following on the earlier paper of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). They solve this if
there is a single period and a known inelastic demand (up to a binding price cap), but cannot
characterise the solution for bids that must hold for many periods (48 in Britain) with uncertain
or varying demand. Hortacsu and Puller (2004) use data that is in step function form, which they
then smooth to determine the marginal revenue of the residual demand facing each generator,
and demonstrate that at least for the larger companies their bids appear to be profit maximising
against this smoothed schedule. Newbery (1992) suggested that if generators randomised over
the positions of the steps in a step function, they could replicate a differentiable supply function,
but it remains an open question whether this would be an optimal response to such behaviour on
the part of other generators.
Standard  Cournot  oligopoly  models  are  simpler,  can  be  defended  in  tight  market
conditions, but suggest a more deterministic outcome than supply function models with their
range  of  indeterminacy.  Increasingly,  consulting  companies  are  developing  price-formation
models, the best of which capture the strategic aspects of supply function models with more
careful modelling of the non-convexities of start-up costs which can dramatically influence the
cost of providing additional power for short periods.
Despite  this  apparent  diversity  of  approach  and  the  rather  unsatisfactory  theoretical
foundations of bidding models, the evidence from various markets is consistent with the SFE
story. Competition is more intense (closer to Bertrand) and prices closer to avoidable costs with
spare available capacity, but as the margin of available capacity decreases, competition becomes
less  intense  and  outcomes  closer  to  Cournot  (as  in  the  SFE).  However,  there  remain  two
additional considerations before we can understand the English price evolution shown in figure
3. First, while the possession of market power is legal, abusing it is not, and dominant generators
need to be aware of the threat of competition references. That is the simplest explanation of
incumbent bidding behaviour from 1990-94, where an acceptable level of prices at which to aim
was arguably the entry price. The second important feature of the Pool is that it is a repeated
auction,  repeated  every  day  and  with  the  evidence  of  bids  and  outcomes  available  with  a
relatively short lag to the participants.
The European Commissions provides a characterisation of collective dominance as a
situation in which the market characteristics are conducive to tacit co-ordination and such co-
ordination is sustainable, that is it is profitable and deviations can be deterred. The market
characteristics  that  are  conducive  to  tacit  co-ordination  include  concentration,  transparency,Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 14
maturity, with a homogenous product produced by companies with similar costs and market
shares,  facing  an inelastic  demand,  and  with  barriers  to  entry.  Evidence  supporting  such  a
finding would include excess price-cost margins, profits and an insensitivity of prices to cost
falls. With the important exception of barriers to entry, the English Pool appeared to have all
these defining characteristics and behaviour. Tacit co-ordination was therefore to be expected,
and market surveillance should clearly take account of this possibility.
3.1 Tacit co-ordination in the Electricity Pool
Andrew Sweeting (2001) tested for tacit co-ordination by looking at individual company bids,
subtracting all other bids from total demand to determine residual demand, and asking whether
the bids were profit maximising given the residual demand (but ignoring contract positions). He
finds that in the first period up until 1994 both incumbents bid less aggressively than would be
(short-run) profit maximising, and that the prices were on average around the level at which
entry  was  just  profitable.  If  we  were  to  conjecture  what  strategies  collectively  dominant
incumbents might co-ordinate on, given close regulatory scrutiny, then keeping the price at the
entry level while dividing the market in proportion to some objective criterion (such as plant
capacity) would be plausible. It would also explain why both companies were keen to build new
CCGTs even when their economics were marginal,
9 for this would allow them to justify an
increased market share (or in practice, in this prisoners’ dilemma, maintain market share in
response to investment by the other company).
As figure 3 shows, fuel costs continued to fall away from electricity prices, to the point
that the regulator claimed that they represented excess profits. He imposed price caps (on both
the annual average demand- and time-weighted Pool price) until the generators divested enough
plant to improve competition. The companies sold 6,000 MW to Eastern (later TXU) with an
earn-out clause of £6/MWh,
10 ostensibly to compensate for the sulphur permits transferred with
the plant and to reduce the buyer’s risk, but with the additional consequence of raising their
rival’s marginal cost when bidding into the Pool.
Sweeting found that during the period 1996 (after divestiture when the price cap ended)
to 1998, bids seemed to be best responses and thus each firm was non-collusively maximising
profits. The price-cost margin increased as the regulatory threat of market abuse was replaced by
(rather relaxed) competitive pressure, and the incumbents were probably quite happy to have
sold plant at prices reflecting market power, in a market that was continuing to experience rapid
entry. The ability to sustain a high price-cost margin depends on the volume of excess capacity,
which was threatening to increase rapidly unless more coal plant were withdrawn or scrapped.
At the same time Offer and Parliament (through the select committee  that investigated the
energy industries) were becoming increasingly convinced that the Pool was not working well,
and that the detailed rules of the dispatch algorithm were being manipulated to increase profits
                                                
9  While it is true that IPPs also entered, they did so on rather favourable long-term contracts not
available to the incumbent generators. Certainly given the early gas prices and CCGT efficiencies, and
compared to the opportunity cost of coal, the economics of investment were very marginal, as the
House of Commons (1993) argued.
10  That is, Eastern paid £6/MWh to the selling company for all electricity generated, increasing the
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(Offer, 1998a-c).  Henney (2001) notes other sources of discontent, notably the Labour Party’s
belief that the Pool used “an operating and pricing system that was not competitive and was
weighted against coal” (Robinson, 2001).
4 THE NEW ELECTRICITY TRADING ARRANGEMENTS (NETA)
In October 1997, the Minister for Science, Energy and Technology asked the DGES to review
the electricity trading arrangements might and to report results by July 1998. Offer's objectives,
approved  by  the  Government,  were  to  consider  whether,  and  if  so  what,  changes  in  the
electricity arrangements would best meet the needs of customers with respect to price, choice,
quality and security of supply; enable demand to be met efficiently and economically; enable
costs and risks to be reduced and shared efficiently, provide transparency; respond flexibly to
changing circumstances; promote competition in electricity markets, facilitating entry and exit
from such markets; avoid discrimination against particular energy sources; and be compatible
with Government policies (Offer, 1998d, pp 83-4).
The process that led to the eventual ending of the Pool and its replacement by NETA
have been extensively described and criticised elsewhere (e.g. Newbery, 1998b,c). Shuttleworth
(1999), writing after the publication of Offer’s Interim Conclusion (Offer, 1998d), noted that “it
is difficult to find any rigorous analysis to underpin the reform proposals”, while Newbery
(1998c)  concluded  that  “(T)he  present  review  appears  to  have  relied  mainly  upon
unsubstantiated  claims,  inappropriate  analogies,  unquantified  criticisms,  and  a  remarkably
uncritical  assessment by  the  participants  of  the  debate,  without  commissioning  the  kind  of
detailed  analysis  one  might  have  expected  from  a  regulatory  agency  claiming  industry
expertise.”
The Pool Review (Offer, 1998e) argued that the complexities of price formation in the
Pool allowed generators to exercise more market power than would have been possible had the
market been structured more like a classic commodity market. It criticised the opaque method of
determining price based on a scheduling algorithm(GOAL) devised for the vertically integrated
(between transmission and generation) CEGB, as well as the capacity payments, and the concept
of a single-price auction. It also criticised the Pooling and Settlement Agreement (PSA) for
blocking desirable changes, because as a contract between parties it could only be changed with
their agreement, and, given the voting arrangements, it was rare for any change to make all
parties better off. The recommendations Pool Review were accepted and NETA went live on 27
March 2001. NETA replaced the PSA by a Balancing and Settlement Code with a well-defined
method of making modifications, giving Ofgem more influence in the process. The Pool ceased
to exist. Electricity was now to be traded in four voluntary, overlapping and interdependent
markets operating over different time scales. Bilateral contract markets cover the medium and
long run, while forward markets offer standard contracts (base-load, peak hours) for periods up
to several years ahead. A short-term “prompt” bilateral market (OTC and exchange), operating
from at least 24 hours to Gate Closure (3
1/2 hours before a trading period, subsequently reduced
to one hour in July 2002), allowed parties to adjust their portfolio of contracts to match their
predicted physical positions. This short-term market would yield information to construct a spot
price for each half-hour (e.g. the UKPX Reference Price Data).Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 16
At Gate Closure, the official end of the bilateral markets, all parties had to announce
their Final Physical Notifications (FPN) to the System Operator (SO). The SO would then
accept bids and offers for balancing the system. These bids and offers would be fed into the
Balancing Mechanism to produce cash-out prices for clearing imbalances between traders’ FPNs
and their actual (metered) positions.
The most obvious difference between NETA and the Pool is that under the Pool all
generation  was  centrally  dispatched  while  under  NETA  plant  is  self-dispatched.  The
obligation to balance output with demand is now placed on each generator, with the SO’s task
confined to ensuring system stability. The Pool, that acted as both a wholesale market for all
electricity and  allowed NGC as SO to balance the system, was replaced by  a Balancing
Mechanism (also operated by NGC as SO) for the residual imbalances of parties that fail to
self-balance. Whereas the Pool operated as a uniform single-price auction for buying and
selling all power (including that needed for system balance), the Balancing Mechanism is run
as a discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auction. NGC charges for balancing through the Balancing
Services Use of System charge.
11
Elexon  determines  two  cash-out  prices:  the  weighted  average  of  accepted  offers
determines the System Buy Price (SBP) and that of bids the System Sell Price (SSP). Any
party found to be out-of-balance when metered amounts are compared with FPNs is charged
either the SBP (if they are short, that is the FPN is more than the metered output (for a
generator) or less than metered consumption (for a consumer), or they receive the SSP if they
are long (and have to spill power). The critical feature of the original design of the Balancing
Mechanism is that these  prices  are  normally  different  (SBP  ³  SSP),
12  and  penalise  each
party’s imbalances, whether or not they amplify or reduce the system imbalance as a whole.
Figure 6 below gives an indication of this volatility.
As a result of the initially extreme volatility of the balancing prices a considerable
number of modifications were made. One of the more important (P78, shown on figure 6)
made  the  reverse  balancing  price  (i.e.  the  price  facing  parties  who  were  in  the  opposite
position  to  the  overall  market,  e.g.  long  when  the  market  was  short,  and  hence  aiding
balance) would revert to the spot price, and hence not penalise those helping balance the
system relative to their selling in the spot market. The idea of moving to a single marginal
balancing price has been mooted but so far rejected by Ofgem.
Note that there are two distinguishing characteristics of the Balancing Mechanism,
either of which could be changed independently. The first is that there are (normally) two
different prices for being short or long. The second characteristic is that these prices are
determined from a discriminatory auction in which bids and offers pay or are paid as bid, and
the average cost of securing the services is then charged out.
13  One consequence of this
                                                
11  Ofgem is wedded to the fiction that it is possible to distinguish between the cost of trades that are
required to balance the system and the penal charges levied through the cash-out prices for individual
imbalance, and has elaborate rules for drawing this distinction.
12 The prices were equal by about 25% of the time, and SSP exceeded SBP very occasionally (0.1% of
the time) in the first 18 months.
13 The Dutch balancing market is at the other extreme. It operates a uniform price auction to determine
a single price for those 15-minute periods in which the system is either long or short for the wholeConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 17
combination is that it is more risky for a generator to offer balancing services. If a generator
has an accepted offer to increase output, and then suffers a loss of output, he is likely to have
to pay more than he is paid. He may therefore prefer to retain the spinning reserve for his
own insurance. A single final balancing price would make such an offer never any worse than
self-insuring and normally better, and would thus promote a more liquid balancing market.
4.1  The evolution of market structure
During the period in which NETA was under discussion, National Power and PowerGen had
to  decide  on  their  future  strategy  in  the  face  of  considerable  uncertainty  about  market
developments  and  impending  excess  capacity.  Until  1995,  the  Regional  Electricity
Companies (RECs) had been protected against take-over by Golden Shares, but these lapsed
and in the following few months eight of the 12 RECs were targeted. Six were successfully
acquired, two by other UK regulated utilities, one by the vertically integrated Scottish electric
utility, Scottish Power, and two by US utilities.  The two RECs targeted by National Power and
PowerGen were referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and then blocked by the
DTI. One of these was subsequently bought by another US utility group.
The  logic  of  combining  risky  generation  with  the  offsetting  risks  of  downstream
customers was amplified by the very favourable low debt position of these regulated utilities,
and made them irresistible to the duopoly generators, but their market power made vertical
reintegration unlikely to pass the competition authorities.
14 The obvious solution was for the
companies  to  divest  generation  so  that  they  could  pass  scrutiny  when  they  bid  for  supply
companies, that in preparation for full retail liberalisation were being unbundled from the REC
distribution businesses. The urgency of achieving this objective was increased by the uncertainty
over the new trading arrangements. Thus on 25 November 1998 PowerGen entered undertakings
with the Secretary of State to sell 4,000 MW of plant and to end the earn-out clause on its 1996
power station sales in return for clearance to acquire East Midlands Electricity’s distribution and
supply business. Similarly National Power agreed to sell the 4,000 MW Drax station in order to
buy the supply business of Midlands Electric. The delicate task facing National Power and
PowerGen was to sell the plant for attractive prices into a market that was in danger of being
oversupplied with increasing gas generation. Here the new Labour Government helped by
imposing a moratorium on building new gas-fired plant in 1997 to assist the coal mining
industry during the period of sorting out the Pool (and also imposed a so-called Climate
Change Levy that was actually a tax on energy rather than carbon, again protecting coal). The
DTI estimated that this delayed the building of 5,800 MW of gas-fired capacity.
                                                                                                                                                       
period, and charges those who are short while rewarding those long. There is the potential (not yet
used) to add a penalty of 1Euro/MWh to both imbalances. If the system is both short and long within
the  15  minute  period  it  determines  two  prices,  effectively  one  for  each  sub-period  in  which  the
imbalance is in one direction.
14  Risks could have been hedged by long-term contracts between generation and supply companies,
but the transaction costs of writing long-term contracts to cover all contingencies (such as the ending
of  the  Pool,  the  Emissions  Trading  System,  Climate  Change  Levy,  Renewables  Obligation
Certificates)  might  make  vertical  integration  more  attractive.  Supply  companies  also  suffer  from
credit risk as they are typically under-capitalised unless combined with generation or distribution.Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 18
The solution was to ensure that the price-cost margin remained high while plant was
offered for sale, and Sweeting (2001) identifies the period from 1998-early 2000 as one in
which National Power and PowerGen could have increased their individual profits if they had
bid lower prices. That is consistent with co-ordinating on a higher-price equilibrium than
short-run myopic profit maximisation would deliver. During this period plant was profitably
sold, indicated by the falling HHI in figure 3, and the changing shares in figure 5.
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The companies buying the plant were warned by Ofgem that there was no guarantee
that prices would remain high, particularly given the impending arrival of NETA, which
Ofgem  was  claiming  would  itself  lead  to  prices  at  least  10%  lower  than  otherwise.
Nevertheless, Edison Mission paid £1.3 billion for the 2000 MW stations at Fiddler’s Ferry
and Ferrybridge in July 1999, or £314/kW, and increased the plant output by more than 30%.
With the new buyers keen to improve the returns on their purchases by increasing plant
output,  figure  3  shows  that  the  earlier  co-ordinated  duopoly  equilibrium  was  no  longer
sustainable and the price-cost margin collapsed before NETA went live, but after the fall in
concentration (HHI). Edison Mission subsequently sold its two stations in October 2001 for
less than half the purchase price (incurring a balance sheet impairment of $1.15 billion on the
$2 billion purchase cost).
4.2  The impact of the new trading arrangements on market performance
The  intellectual  case  for  replacing  the  Pool  through  which  all  energy  was  traded  by  a
voluntary Balancing Mechanism covering rather less than 2% of energy was that this would
force both buyers and sellers to haggle over the price of electricity without the clear andConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 19
transparent  signals  delivered  by  the  Pool.  If  parties  were  forced  by  a  risky,  opaque  and
potentially penal imbalance market to contract ahead, consumers would have time to shop
around for better deals, making the market more competitive. This argument ignores two
important facts. The first is that about 90% of electricity traded before NETA was under
contract, and the annual contract round was a period of intense haggling. NETA did not
change that.
The  second  is  that  the  relative  bargaining  strength  of  generators  and  consumers
depends more on the ability of generators to hold the market to ransom than the fine details of
the  spot  or  balancing  market.  This  strength  is  best  measured  by  the  extent  to  which
consumers  can  meet  their  total  demand  from  all  other  generators,  and  the  number  of
generators that are pivotal (i.e. essential) for meeting demand. The loss to a generator of not
selling is the difference between the price and variable cost (shown in figure 3), whereas that
to a consumer of not being able to buy power is potentially the difference between the value
of lost load and the  price,  which  may  be  hundreds  of  times  as  large.  Pivotal  generators
therefore have very considerable bargaining power in any market design.
Three factors influence this bargaining power – the number of competing generators,
the reserve margin, and (in the longer run) the ease of entry. Entry was extremely easy in the
Pool, but, after vertical integration and with the removal of a guaranteed market of final
resort,  considerably  riskier  under  NETA.  The  Pool  reserve  margin  was  normally  quite
adequate as a result of earlier entry, while competition had just become intense as the Pool
ended, and was already demonstrating its impact on spot and contract prices. The claim that
NETA  therefore  was  necessary  (and  sufficient)  to  mitigate  generator  market  power  is
unsubstantiated.
There was a rather more confused claim that replacing a single price auction (like the
Pool) by a pay-as-bid or discriminatory auction would obviously lower the average price,
ignoring  the  auction  literature  on  revenue  equivalence.  A  more  sophisticated  claim  was
advanced  by  Currie  (2000),  who  argued  that  repeated  single-price  auctions  encouraged
collusion more than discriminatory auctions. Newbery and McDaniel (2003) argued that the
theoretical, empirical and experimental evidence on auction design applied to the electricity
market  was  ambiguous.  Fabra  et  al  (2003)  developed  simple  models  comparing  the  two
auction designs and were able to demonstrate that with predictable and unchanging demand, a
discriminatory auction would yield lower (short-run) prices than a single price auction, but
would typically lead to a less efficient use of plant. They were not able to produce results for
multi-period and repeated auctions.
Offer (1999) estimated the costs of switching to NETA at about £700 million (spread
over a five year period) followed by additional annual costs of £30 million.
15 Offer justified
this cost by claiming that prices would fall 10% as a direct result (although this would be a
transfer from generators to consumers, not a net social benefit). The Government helped by
removing the gas moratorium, but in the event prices fell so far that CCGT entry was put on
                                                
15  “The  costs  of  implementing  and  operating  the  new  trading  arrangements  are  estimated  to  be
between about £136m to £146m per annum, for a five year period.  Thereafter the operating costs are
expected to be of the order of £30m per annum.” (Offer, 1999, p14). These continuing costs almost
certainly understate the extra costs of maintaining 24-7 trading floors for balancing.Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 20
hold indefinitely. Ofgem was able to claim that the “Evidence of the first year of NETA
shows wholesale prices around 40% below those under the former Electricity Pool.” (Ofgem,
2002). While this may exaggerate the fall, figure 3 shows that compared to 1999, prices at the
time of NETA were indeed substantially lower. Newbery and McDaniel (2003) argued that
the  price  fall  was  due  to  competition,  not  NETA,  as  prices  fell  before  NETA,  and  as
electricity cannot be stored, future prospects of changed trading should have had no impact
on pre-NETA prices. John Bower (2002) (who supplied the plant data used in Figure 4)
demonstrated this more rigorously using formal econometric tests. Evans and Green (2003)
confirmed  this  finding  for  Bower’s  specification,  but  raised  the  question  whether  the
announced end of the Pool would unravel the collusive equilibrium by backward induction
for the point at which the Pool (and transparent pricing) would end. They found support for a
variable  “para-NETA”  that  takes  the  value  0  until  October  2000,  and  1  thereafter.  An
alternative and simpler explanation is that indeed collusion ended, but because of the actual
fall in concentration, an event set in motion, not by the anticipated NETA, but by the desire
of the incumbents to integrate forward into supply, expressed as early as 1995.
In the medium run the average price in any electricity market will be determined by
the conditions and costs of entry and exit (and possibly on the threat of price caps or other
regulatory interventions that might reduce expected profits). The first publication of the Joint
Energy  Security  of  Supply  (JESS)  Working  Group  in  June  2002  stated  that  “Capacity
margins are healthy and are expected to remain so.” Their next report in February 2003
indicated no change. Shortly thereafter, generating companies started to experience financial
distress and some went into administration. British Energy, the privatised nuclear company,
had to be bailed out by the Government, and surviving companies started to scrap or mothball
plant. The plant reserve margin fell to below the NGC’s target margin of 20%, and in the
summer of 2003, NGC’s forecasts suggested a rapidly deteriorating situation. In response,
Winter  2003/4  forward  peak  prices  rose  from  £25/MWh  to  over  £35/MWh  and  some
mothballed plant was returned to the system.
In the event the winter was mild (only 15% of winters in the past 75 years were as
mild), demand was lower than the previous year, and there were no capacity shortages. The
Third JESS Report in November 2003 claimed that forward markets were delivering the
appropriate  signals  and  participants  were  responding  as  they  should,  although  the  scare
revealed a worrying lack of information about the status and likely time needed to return
mothballed plant. The impact of plant removal and narrowing reserve margins can be seen in
figure  3,  where  the  price-cost  margin  has  returned  a  considerable  way  towards  a  more
sustainable equilibrium (although one that in 2004 was still too low to justify new build).
What can we conclude from this expensive change in market arrangements? First, the
costs of balancing have been increased, to the detriment of non-portfolio generators (i.e. new
entrants and British Energy) and intermittent suppliers like wind.
16 The balancing prices are
considerably more volatile and unpredictable than the Pool prices that served as a more liquid
balancing market. Figure 6 shows 7-day moving averages of the buy and sell prices, and, to
                                                
16  Although the net surplus of the Balancing Mechanism is recycled, there are transfers between
different types of participants, while there are extra real costs in requiring all participants to replicate
the SO balancing function, especially in maintaining spinning reserve.Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 21
give a sense of the risk in the SBP, gives one standard deviation of the 7-day half-hourly buy
prices, as well as the underlying spot price.


























































































































































Source: Elexon price data: UKPX is the Reference Price Data for the day-ahead spot market
The  costs  of  balancing  will  depend  on  whether  the  participant  is  a  generator  or
supplier. As contestability  is a key issue, the relevant question is whether the  Balancing
Mechanism (BM) unreasonably raises the risk to a small entrant. This can be estimated as the
risk of having to pay the buy price (SBP) after a generator suffers a forced outage, in order to
meet an assumed contract position. If a generator fails at a random moment and stays off-line
for 24 hours, the cost will be the 24-hour average of the SBP from that moment. In the year
before the P78 rule change indicated above, the expected cost of such an outage (relative to
an  assumed  variable  cost  of  £12/MWh)  was  £17/MWh  or  £0.4/kW/event  compared  to
£13/MWh or £0.32/kW/event under the Pool for 1997-8. The variance was, however, twice
as high as under the Pool. In the year following P78, the average cost had fallen to £11/MWh
or £0.3/kW/event and the variance had also fallen to 150% that of the Pool.
Figure 7 illustrates the cost duration curve for balancing under NETA from April 1
2003-31 Mar 2004 compared to the Pool in 1997-98. Thus 5% of the time the cost would be
£30/MWh for the following 24 hours in both the Pool and the recent BM and 1% of the time
it would be £70/MWh in the BM compared with £44/MWh under the Pool. The risks in the
early days of NETA were very much higher and led to claims that plant was inefficiently
part-loaded to avoid penal imbalance costs, at considerably higher cost.Confpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 22
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One should interpret this finding with some care, as the Pool required bids to remain
valid for 24 hours while bids and offers to the BM can be changed on a short time scale and
in response to a perceived tightening of the market when a large unit goes off-line, making it
more risky for generators to handle outages. Even if we ignore such responses, if a large plant
were to go down, the demand in the BM might be such as to considerably increase the short-
run cost, but without knowing the shape of the bids and offers it is hard to estimate by how
much.
The effect on suppliers is that they would over-contract on average as the SBP is more
penal than spilling the surplus at the SSP, and this would (slightly) raise the cost and risk of
selling.  This  may  have  the  desirable  effect  of  encouraging  contracting,  which  tends  to
mitigate generator market power in the spot market, although at the expense of increasing
demand and hence market power in the contract market. The low liquidity of most electricity
markets (and certainly the British markets) makes the cost of rebalancing contract positions
high and again acts as an entry barrier.
Second, the BM mutes scarcity signals by paying generators their bid price and not
the marginal price (in order to mitigate market power and possibly reduce volatility). This,
together with the lack of integration with spot, forward and contract markets, and the lack of
any capacity payment, makes the entry decision more uncertain and risky, and may lead to
lower reserve margins. If so, then the lower reserve margins and the extra entry costs will
allow  a  higher  average  wholesale  price,  refuting  Offer’s  claim  that  NETA  alone  (i.e.
regardless of market structure) would reduce wholesale prices by 10%. Again, this claim
needs to be examined carefully, for example, for a peaking generator that can offer balancing
services of an hour duration at very short notice. If this generator burns distillate at a cost ofConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 23
£50/MWh, then if it were to bid the SBP it would earn £21/kW/yr under NETA (net of fuel
costs) running the 409 hours the SBP exceeded £50/MWh, and £12.6/kW/yr under the Pool
running the corresponding 662 hours. One obvious problem with this calculation is that while
it is riskless to offer capacity to the Pool at the avoidable cost of £50/MWh, it requires skilled
bidding to achieve the SBP in a pay-as-bid market. Nevertheless, while a peaking generator
might have some difficulty paying its grid charges (which vary across the country) from
+£9/kW/yr to -£7/kW/yr) and other fixed costs (perhaps £6/kW/yr) under the Pool, NETA
appears to provide reasonable incentives apart from the problem of bidding. This could be
circumvented by offering such services to NGC on contract to bid into the BM.
The  early  complaints  of  wind  generators  and  CHP  that  they  were  discriminated
against have not been adequately tested against more recent market conditions – certainly
CHP output dropped dramatically but that was arguably because of the adverse spark-spread
(electricity less gas cost). Wind power now typically sells on contract to supply companies
who can better manage the imbalance risk within their entire portfolio, and is in any case
massively rewarded by Renewable Obligation Certificates that increase the electricity price
from around £25/MWh to £65/MWh.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The British experiments have demonstrated a number of important lessons for electricity
market  liberalisation.  First,  ownership  unbundling  of  transmission  from  generation  helps
support a competitive wholesale market, which in turn puts pressure on companies to reduce
costs. Scotland failed this test and failed to improve its performance. Second, efficient pricing
of scarce interconnector capacity and charging correctly for losses might have allowed the
Scottish market to import English competition, but was blocked by the courts. Third, while
competition drives down costs, concentrated markets can sustain inefficiently high price-cost
margins.  Pivotal  generators  retain  market  power  that  is  best  addressed  by  reducing
concentration, although entry that increases the reserve margin also helps. Tacit co-ordination
is  likely  given  electricity  market  characteristics,  and  is  best  addressed  by  encouraging
contracts and reducing concentration. Fourth, investment in generation can be facilitated by a
transparent Pool, domestic franchises, and wholesale market power. Britain replaced nearly
one-third  of  its  (already  adequate)  capacity  by  such  means.  Entry  (including  returning
mothballed plant to service) is responsive to price signals (the forward spark-spread).
Fifth, unbundling and liberalisation increases risk for generators and encourages them
to seek vertical integration with suppliers. This offers the opportunity for the regulator and
competition  authorities  to  trade  horizontal  for  vertical  integration  and  to  reduce
concentration, at the cost of increased entry barriers. A better alternative is to start from a
more fragmented structure. That would allow one to consider legal restraints on such vertical
integration to encourage more contracting and market liquidity, but we lack evidence on the
costs and advantages of such enforced competition.
Sixth, the British contractual approach to liberalisation that requires licences to be
held by both potentially competitive and natural monopoly segments has worked better than
many of the Continental alternatives (and arguably the US’s onerous duty on regulators to
deliver “just and reasonable” prices). Licences require the holders to provide the regulatorConfpap\Enjourn\Britain 30/11/04 24
with the information needed for adequate market monitoring, and allow market abuses to be
swiftly and cheaply addressed.
Finally, such apparently basic issues as the desirability or not of capacity payments
(or obligations) and the design of the wholesale and balancing markets remain unresolved.
The ideal of a Pool with adequate competition, capacity payments, and a better governance
structure for rule changes was never tried, and might have worked as well or better than
NETA, with its emphasis on bilateral contracting and opaque balancing costs. On balance,
NETA  replaced  the  Pool’s  flawed  governance  structure  by  one  more  susceptible  to
incremental improvement  (though  at  the  cost  of  greater  regulatory  uncertainty),  failed  to
increase either the liquidity of markets or the participation of the true demand side, increased
trading costs, replaced capacity payments by a pay-as-bid balancing mechanism, and cost
over £700 million.
Once it settled down and the obvious changes were made, NETA probably delivers
similar outcomes as the Pool  from  existing  generation.  Entry  is  now  more  difficult  than
before, but that is not solely due to NETA. Vertical integration has reduced the demand for
suppliers to contract, the end of the domestic franchise has removed the logical counter-party
to contracts with new independent generators, but the removal of the Pool as a market of last
resort almost certainly raises entry costs. Just at the time that FERC has embraced the concept
of  a  Pool  (with  locational  marginal  pricing)  as  the  benchmark  for  the  Standard  Market
Design, Britain has abandoned a model whose main failing was its poor market structure and
governance.
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